| Opinion | Pub Date | Short Title/District |
|---|---|---|
| 07a0113p.06 | 2007/03/28 | Maday v. Pub Lib Saginaw Eastern District of Michigan at Bay City Age discrimination claim and alleged violation of FMLA; attorney misconduct and new trial; hearsay and admission of third-party statements; attorney-client privilege and social-worker privilege. |
| 07a0114p.06 | 2007/03/29 | USA v. Davist Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. Defendant Davist appeals from his sentence for false claims against the United States, conspiracy to defraud the United States, and false statements. He argues that the district court erred in issuing a two-point enhancement under U.S.S.G. § 3C1.1. Finding no error, we affirm.
|
| 07a0115p.06 | 2007/03/30 | USA v. Kosinski Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit CLAY, Circuit Judge. Defendant, Timothy Kosinski, was convicted of one count of conspiring to defraud the Internal Revenue Service ("IRS") and to structure currency transactions to evade IRS reporting requirements, in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 371; five counts of submitting false federal income tax returns, in violation of 26 U.S.C. § 7206(1); and one count of structuring a currency transaction to evade IRS reporting requirements, in violation of 31 U.S.C. §§ 5324(a)(3) and 5324(d)(1). Defendant was sentenced to a term of three years under probation supervision, with the condition that the first six months be served in a halfway house and that the second six months be served under home confinement. The government appeals the district court’s sentence. For the following reasons, we VACATE the district court’s sentence and REMAND this case to the district court for resentencing. |
| 07a0116p.06 | 2007/03/30 | Thomas v. Unknown Eby Western District of Michigan at Marquette KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Inmate Jerald Thomas filed this 42 U.S.C. § 1983 action alleging that a prison guard retaliated against him for exercising his First Amendment rights. The district court concluded that if Thomas won his case, the victory would shorten his period of custodial detention. Accordingly, the district court concluded that the habeas exception to § 1983 barred Thomas’s complaint, which the district court dismissed sua sponte. Because a victory for Thomas would have at most the potential to decrease his period of detention and because Thomas has alleged adequately the elements of a First Amendment retaliation claim, we REVERSE the district court’s judgment and REMAND this case for further proceedings. |
| 07a0117p.06 | 2007/03/30 | Leffman v. Sprint Corporation Northern District of Ohio at Toledo KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. In this employment discrimination suit, Plaintiff- Appellant Linda Leffman (“Leffman”) alleges that Defendant-Appellee Sprint Corporation (“Sprint”) violated Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e et seq., by denying her, in calculating her years of service at the time of her termination in 2000, credit for time that she spent on maternity leave in 1976. The district court granted summary judgment in favor of Sprint, and Leffman now appeals. For the reasons set forth below, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court. |
| 07a0118p.06 | 2007/03/30 | Bridgeport Music Inc v. Universal-MCA Music Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Bridgeport Music, Inc. and Southfield Music, Inc. (collectively, Bridgeport) filed suit against approximately 800 defendants involved in the record and music-publishing business, alleging various claims of copyright infringement. After conceding the weakness of its claims against the 20 defendants named in this appeal (collectively, the appellants), but not before the parties had expended significant time and money in discovery and other forms of trial preparation, Bridgeport moved to voluntarily dismiss without prejudice its actions against them. The appellants agreed to the dismissals, but asked the district court to impose reasonable “terms and conditions” in entering the judgment, specifically in the form of attorney fees. In nearly identical, three-sentence orders granting the voluntary dismissals without prejudice, the district court failed to provide any reason for its decision to deny the appellants’ request. It instead ordered “each party to bear its own attorneys’ fees and costs.” For the reasons set forth below, we VACATE the judgment of the district court and REMAND the case for a more detailed order specifically addressing the appellants’ request for reasonable terms and conditions relating to the dismissal of Bridgeport’s complaints. |
| 07b0005p.06 | 2007/03/30 | In re: Mark Taranto v. Northern District of Ohio at Akron JAMES D. GREGG, Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Judge. DaimlerChrysler Services North America LLC (“Appellant”) appeals the bankruptcy court’s order overruling its objection to confirmation of Mark and Kimberly Taranto’s (“Debtors”) proposed second amended chapter 13 plan. The plan provides for payment of the full principal amount of the Appellant’s secured claim approximately 45 months sooner than provided for in the contract and for payment of interest at the contract rate of zero percent. The Appellant asserts it is entitled to prime-plus interest in accordance with Till v. SCS Credit Corp., infra. The Appellant’s claim is secured by a vehicle purchased for the Debtors’ personal use within 910 days prior to the bankruptcy filing. The bankruptcy court overruled the Appellant’s objection to the Debtors’ plan determining that the application of Till, infra, would result in an unfair diminution in the distribution to the Debtors’ unsecured creditors thereby giving an unjustified windfall to the Appellant. For the reasons that follow, the bankruptcy court’s order is REVERSED and REMANDED. |
| 07b0006p.06 | 2007/03/30 | In re: Lebovitz v. Western District of Tennessee at Memphis JAMES D. GREGG, Bankruptcy Appellate Panel Judge. In this chapter 7 case, the Debtor appeals the bankruptcy court’s order granting the Trustee’s motion for turnover and sustaining the Trustee’s objection to the exemption claimed by the Debtor in five pieces of jewelry. The Debtor claims the jewelry is exempt as “necessary and proper wearing apparel” pursuant to Tennessee Code Annotated § 26-2-104. For the reasons that follow, the bankruptcy court’s order is AFFIRMED. |