PUBLISHED OPINIONS
| Opinion | Short Title/District |
|---|---|
| 08a0432p.06 | Kevin Dunn, Sr. v. B. Matatall Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Kevin Dunn, Sr. appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Defendants-Appellees Officer B. Matatall and Sergeant Lawrence Porter (collectively, “the Officers”). The Officers arrested Dunn after he led Officer Matatall on a two-minute car chase through a residential neighborhood at speeds approaching fifty miles per hour. Dunn’s leg was broken when the Officers removed him from his car during the course of the arrest. Dunn brought a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that the Officers violated his Fourth Amendment rights by using excessive force, and the Officers moved for summary judgment, claiming qualified immunity. The district court granted summary judgment, finding that the Officers committed no constitutional violation. On appeal, Dunn argues that the district court erred in deciding as a matter of law that the Officers’ use of force was objectively reasonable. |
| 08a0433p.06 | James Pickens v. Carol Howes Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit |
| 08a0433p.06 | James Pickens v. Carol Howes Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit |
| 08a0434p.06 | USA v. Campbell Western District of Tennessee at Memphis |
| 08a0435p.06 | USA v. Smith Eastern District of Kentucky at London BOGGS, Chief Judge. Defendant Terrence Tyrone Smith appeals from the district court’s denial of his motion to suppress the evidence underlying his guilty plea to two counts of possession with intent to distribute five grams or more of cocaine base. Smith also appeals from the district court’s sentence of 240 months, based in part on the court’s determination that Smith was a career offender. We hold that police officers had probable cause to arrest Smith and search him incident to the arrest, and that Smith was a career offender under the Sentencing Guidelines. Therefore, we affirm. |
| 08a0436p.06 | Medical Mutual of Ohio v. k. Amalia Enterprises Inc. Southern District of Ohio at Columbus KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff-Appellant Medical Mutual of Ohio (“MMO”), an insurance company, brought suit against Loan A. Tran (“Tran”) and Khanh B. Luu (“Luu”) for failing to disclose that their dependent son had a preexisting medical condition (hemophilia). MMO also included as defendants Tran’s employer, k. Amalia Enterprises Inc. (“k. Amalia”), which contracted with MMO to provide group health insurance, and k. Amalia’s Chief Financial Officer, John M. Barr (“Barr”), who signed the group-health-insurance contract on behalf 1 No. 07-4422 Medical Mutual of Ohio v. k. Amalia Enterprises Inc. et al. Page 2 1Tran worked for MJR International, which was affiliated with k. Amalia. There was one group-health plan for both companies. of k. Amalia. MMO appeals the district court’s grant of summary judgment to k. Amalia, Barr, Tran, and Luu. Because all of MMO’s claims are barred by a contractual limitations provision, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment to k. Amalia, Barr, Tran, and Luu and AFFIRM the district court’s denial of MMO’s motion for reconsideration. Because all of MMO’s claims are barred by the contractual limitations period, we AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment to k. Amalia, Barr, Tran, and Luu. Because MMO’s motion for reconsideration did not raise any issues that affect our analysis, we also AFFIRM the district court’s denial of MMO’s motion for reconsideration. |
| 08a0437p.06 | USA v. Ghassan Haj-Hamed Eastern District of Kentucky at Covington McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. Ghassan Haj-Hamed, M.D., pleaded guilty to one count of distributing prescription drugs without a legitimate medical purpose. The district court sentenced him to twenty-seven months of imprisonment, the bottom of the range calculated under the United States Sentencing Guidelines (“Guidelines” or “U.S.S.G.”). Dr. Haj-Hamed appeals his sentence. Finding his sentence procedurally and substantively reasonable, we affirm |
| 08b0021p.06 | In re: Ronald Anderson v. U.S. Bankruptcy Court - Marquette |
| 08a0438p.06 | McKnight v. GMC Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit JULIA SMITH GIBBONS, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs-appellants Leroy McKnight, Nicholas Klayo, and Robert Griffin (“plaintiffs”) are former employees of General Motors Corporation (“GM”) who accepted the early retirement option provided in GM’s pension plans. Each plaintiff also applied for, and received, Social Security Disability Insurance Benefits (“SSDIB”) following retirement. Pursuant to provisions of the GM pension plans, plaintiffs’ retirement benefits were reduced by the amount received from the government in SSDIB benefits. The primary issue on appeal presents, in part, a question over which the circuits are split: whether disabled former employees have standing under Title I of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq. (“ADA”), to bring suit against their former employers for discrimination with respect to the payment of post-employment fringe benefits. Plaintiffs contend that such employees do have 1 No. 07-1479 McKnight, et al. v. General Motors Corp. Page 2 standing under the ADA, and, moreover, GM’s pension plans do not provide equal access to disabled and non-disabled employees. The district court disagreed with plaintiff’s contentions and granted summary judgment in favor of GM. For the reasons set forth below, we conclude that the plaintiffs do not have standing under Title I of the ADA to pursue their claims. Furthermore, we note that, even if plaintiffs had standing, their claims would fail on the merits. We therefore affirm the district court. |
| 08a0439a.06 | J & R Marketing v. General Motors Corp Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit KENNEDY, Circuit Judge. Plaintiffs, purchasers of bonds registered by GMAC in September 2003, brought suit under Sections 11 and 12(a)(2) of the Securities Act of 1933 against GMAC and its control persons, including General Motors, which at the time wholly-owned GMAC. Plaintiffs alleged that GMAC had breached its disclosure obligations as well as made material misstatements in its registration statements and prospectuses for multiple offerings of bonds registered in 2003 and 2004. The defendants moved to dismiss the plaintiffs’ complaint for failure to state a claim. The district court granted the defendants’ motion. It found that plaintiffs lacked statutory standing to bring claims regarding offerings other than the one in which they had purchased. The district court also found that the plaintiffs had no claim regarding a duty to disclose because Item 303, the regulatory authority relied on by plaintiffs, did not give rise to a duty to disclose the information the plaintiffs sought because the information was not “firm specific” to GMAC. Additionally, the district court found that there was no material omission because the affirmative statements made by GMAC were not rendered misleading by the absence of the information cited by plaintiffs. Lastly, the district court held that most of GMAC’s statements were not false, and the ones that were arguably false were not material to bond investors. We find that the named plaintiffs’ own claims are without merit because the offering materials did not have material omissions because (1) Item 303 only imposes a duty to make forward-looking projections regarding known information, and plaintiffs pleaded only that the information was “knowable”; and (2) GMAC’s affirmative statements were not rendered misleading by the absence of the information described by plaintiffs. We also find that the offering materials for the offering in which plaintiffs’ purchased did not include material misstatements, because the affirmative statements made by GMAC were in fact true. Since the named plaintiffs’ individual claims cannot succeed on the merits, we AFFIRM the judgment of the district court dismissing plaintiffs’ complaint |
NOT RECOMMENDED FOR
FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION OPINIONS
| Opinion | Short Title/District |
|---|---|
| 08a0733n.06 | Scavenger v. Mukasey Board of Immigration Appeals |
| 08a0734n.06 | McCarthy v. Place Southern District of Ohio at Columbus |
| 08a0735n.06 | USA v. Martinez Northern District of Ohio at Toledo |
| 08a0736n.06 | Russell v. State of Ohio Southern District of Ohio at Columbus |
| 08a0737n.06 | Heartwood v. Kempthorne Southern District of Ohio at Cincinnati |
| 08a0738n.06 | Irvin Kramer, Jr. v. Reginald Wilkinson Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland |
| 08a0739n.06 | USA v. Hershel McCaleb Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville |
| 08a0740n.06 | USA v. David Becker Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville |
| 08a0740n.06 | USA v. David Becker Eastern District of Tennessee at Knoxville |
| 08a0741n.06 | Myftari v. Mukasey Board of Immigration Appeals |
| 08a0742n.06 | USA v. Hardy Eastern District of Tennessee of Chattanooga |
| 08a0743n.06 | Andrew Grosjean v. Sharon Bommarito Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit |
| 08a0743n.06 | Andrew Grosjean v. Sharon Bommarito Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit |
| 08a0744n.06 | Patricia Lahar v. Oakland County Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit |
| 08a0745n.06 | Big Lots Stores, Inc. v. Luv N' Care, LTD Southern District of Ohio at Columbus |
| 08a0746n.06 | Smiljanich v. GMC Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit BOYCE F. MARTIN, JR., Circuit Judge. General Motors appeals the district court’s judgment in favor of George Smiljanich on a theory of equitable estoppel and its award of attorneys’ fees. We affirm the district court’s decision on Smiljanich’s equitable estoppel claim, and reverse the grant of attorneys’ fees for services performed prior to June 22, 2006. |
| 08a0746n.06 | Smiljanich v. GMC Eastern District of Michigan at Detroit |
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